Title VII (Civil Rights Act of 1964)
The principal federal employment discrimination statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and, post-Bostock, sexual orientation/gender identity), and national origin. Applies to employers with 15+ employees. Damages include back pay, compensatory and punitive damages capped by employer size ($50K-$300K), and attorney's fees. Texas state-law parallel: TCHRA (Tex. Lab. Code Ch. 21).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the principal federal employment discrimination statute, prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII transformed American employment law by prohibiting widespread discriminatory practices that previously characterized U.S. workplaces. The statute applies to employers with 15 or more employees and provides administrative exhaustion, federal-court litigation, and capped damages. Major amendments: Pregnancy Discrimination Act (1978), Civil Rights Act of 1991 (compensatory and punitive damages with caps), and judicial extension to LGBT employees through Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020).
Protected classes
Title VII protects against employment discrimination based on five protected classes: (1) race; (2) color; (3) religion; (4) sex, including pregnancy and related conditions per the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and per Bostock (2020) sexual orientation and gender identity; (5) national origin. Section 1981 (42 U.S.C. § 1981) parallels Title VII for race claims with broader coverage (no employer-size threshold, no damages caps) but more limited scope. Title VII covers hiring, firing, promotion, compensation, terms and conditions of employment, and prohibits both discrimination and retaliation for protected activity.
The McDonnell Douglas framework
McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973) established the burden-shifting framework for Title VII disparate-treatment claims when direct evidence is lacking: (1) plaintiff prima facie case, protected class membership; qualified for position; adverse employment action; circumstances giving rise to inference of discrimination; (2) employer rebuttal, articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reason; (3) plaintiff pretext, show employer's reason is pretext for discrimination. Burden of persuasion remains with plaintiff throughout. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (2024) clarified that "adverse employment action" requires only "some harm," not "significant" harm, broadening Title VII's reach to lateral transfers and similar actions.
Disparate impact
Title VII also addresses disparate impact, facially neutral practices with disproportionate adverse effect on protected classes. The plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice and show that it causes a disparate impact. The employer then must show the practice is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Even if it does, the plaintiff can prevail by showing a less discriminatory alternative practice that the employer refuses to adopt. Common targets: testing requirements, height/weight standards, criminal-record screens, credit checks. Executive Order 14281 (April 2025) directs federal agencies to deprioritize enforcement of disparate-impact liability, including under § 2000e-2. Private suits remain available under the statute.
Sexual harassment
Sexual harassment is actionable as sex discrimination. Two principal forms: (1) quid pro quo, adverse employment action conditioned on sexual conduct; (2) hostile work environment, severe or pervasive sex-based harassment. Faragher and Ellerth (1998) established employer liability framework: strict liability for tangible adverse action by supervisor; affirmative defense available where no tangible action, employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct, employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventive opportunities. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA, 2022) invalidates pre-dispute arbitration of sexual harassment claims at employee election.
Religious accommodation, post-Groff
Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), substantially raised the religious accommodation undue-hardship standard. Pre-Groff, TWA v. Hardison (1977) had been read to permit denial when accommodation imposed "more than de minimis" cost. Groff requires employers to show that accommodation would result in "substantial increased costs", a meaningfully higher bar. Post-Groff, religious-accommodation refusals require more substantial justification. Common accommodations: schedule modifications for Sabbath observance, dress and grooming exceptions, prayer-time accommodations, dietary accommodations.
Bostock and LGBT protections
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), held that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination protects sexual orientation and gender identity, the textual reasoning being that firing someone for being gay or transgender necessarily considers sex. The decision resolved a long circuit split and extended Title VII protection to LGBT employees not previously covered. Post-Bostock issues: religious-employer exemptions; coordination with state laws; reasonable accommodation of transgender employees; bathroom/dress-code policies; coordination with EEOC enforcement guidance.
Damages structure
Title VII damages (post-1991): (1) back pay; (2) front pay or reinstatement; (3) compensatory damages for emotional distress and other non-economic harm; (4) punitive damages for violations committed with malice or reckless indifference to federally protected rights, unavailable against government employers; (5) attorney's fees and costs. Compensatory and punitive damages combined are capped by employer size: $50K (15-100 employees); $100K (101-200); $200K (201-500); $300K (more than 500). Back pay, front pay, and equitable relief are not subject to caps. Damages caps are a principal limitation relative to some state-law alternatives.
Administrative exhaustion
Title VII requires administrative exhaustion through EEOC before federal-court suit: (1) charge filing deadline, 180 days standard, 300 days in Texas because a state agency (TWC-CRD) has authority over the practice; (2) EEOC investigation; (3) right-to-sue letter; (4) 90-day federal-suit deadline from right-to-sue letter receipt. Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019), held that exhaustion is non-jurisdictional but mandatory, meaning failure to exhaust can be waived but if timely raised will bar the claim.
In Texas, Title VII largely parallels TCHRA (Tex. Lab. Code Ch. 21), which has the same damages caps but a 180-day complaint deadline, or 300 days for sexual harassment. The Faragher/Ellerth defense turns on whether the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassment and whether the employee unreasonably failed to use the opportunities provided. The Title VII charge deadline in Texas is 300 days, and suit must follow within 90 days after notice of the right to sue.